A Game Theoretic Analysis of Incentives in Content Production and
  Sharing over Peer-to-Peer Networks by Park, Jaeok & van der Schaar, Mihaela
ar
X
iv
:0
91
0.
46
18
v2
  [
cs
.N
I] 
 23
 Ja
n 2
01
0
1
A Game Theoretic Analysis of Incentives
in Content Production and Sharing
over Peer-to-Peer Networks
Jaeok Park and Mihaela van der Schaar
Abstract
User-generated content can be distributed at a low cost using peer-to-peer (P2P) networks, but the
free-rider problem hinders the utilization of P2P networks. In order to achieve an efficient use of P2P
networks, we investigate fundamental issues on incentives in content production and sharing using game
theory. We build a basic model to analyze non-cooperative outcomes without an incentive scheme and
then use different game formulations derived from the basic model to examine five incentive schemes:
cooperative, payment, repeated interaction, intervention, and enforced full sharing. The results of this
paper show that 1) cooperative peers share all produced content while non-cooperative peers do not
share at all without an incentive scheme; 2) a cooperative scheme allows peers to consume more content
than non-cooperative outcomes do; 3) a cooperative outcome can be achieved among non-cooperative
peers by introducing an incentive scheme based on payment, repeated interaction, or intervention; and
4) enforced full sharing has ambiguous welfare effects on peers. In addition to describing the solutions
of different formulations, we discuss enforcement and informational requirements to implement each
solution, aiming to offer a guideline for protocol designers when designing incentive schemes for P2P
networks.
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2I. INTRODUCTION
Recent developments in technology have significantly reduced the cost of producing and distributing
content in various forms such as images, sounds, videos, and text. Once produced only by companies with
a large capital, content can now be produced by end-users. In today’s Internet-based social communities,
peer-to-peer (P2P) networks offer a cost effective and easily deployable framework for sharing user-
generated content [1]. While P2P networks have many advantages such as scalability, resilience, and
effectiveness in coping with dynamics and heterogeneity [2], they are vulnerable to intrinsic incentive
problems in that the transfer of content incurs costs to uploaders as well as to downloaders but benefits
only downloaders. Since the social cost of transfer (the sum of upload and download costs) exceeds the
private cost of transfer (download costs), peers tend to download excessibly as in the tragedy of the
commons problem. On the other hand, since upload incurs costs to uploaders without giving them direct
benefit, peers tend to upload too little. The incentive problem stating that peers desire to benefit from
P2P networks while not contributing to them is referred to as the free-rider (or freeloader) problem.
Various incentive schemes to mitigate the free-rider problem have been proposed and analyzed in
the literature. Cooperative schemes (e.g., [3], [4]) utilize helpers that download files on behalf of a
peer in the same collaborative group. Helpers can improve the download performance of P2P networks
by sharing their spare upload capacities. However, forming and sustaining collaborative groups in a
distributed system poses a main challenge to cooperative schemes. Payment schemes (e.g., [5], [6]) use
virtual currency or micropayment to reward upload and charge download. Payment schemes have a solid
theoretical foundation as they are based on economic models. However, they are regarded impractical
because they require an accounting infrastructure to track the transactions of peers [7]. Differential service
schemes (e.g., [8], [9]) allow peers to make upload decisions based on the rating of a peer that requests
content from them. Since a peer with a good reputation is treated preferentially by other peers, differential
service schemes provide incentives for peers to contribute in order to build and maintain a good reputation.
However, differential service schemes require large communication overheads to determine and announce
the ratings of peers. The rating of a peer is determined by its past actions, which are observed by different
peers, and peers need to know the rating of every other peer that they interact with.
Game theory [10] offers a useful framework to model multi-user interaction and has been applied
to analyze the behavior of peers in P2P networks. Incentive schemes such as payment schemes and
differential service schemes have been investigated using non-cooperative game theory. Payment schemes
can be easily incorporated in static game models as in [11], while differential service schemes have been
3studied in the context of different game models. [7] uses a static game model to analyze the steady-
state outcome of learning dynamics under a differential service scheme. [12] simulates an evolutionary
game model to examine the performance of a differential service scheme based on peer reciprocation.
[13] uses a repeated game model to construct a differential service scheme based on the idea of social
norms [14]. [15] and [16] apply the mechanism design approach to build optimal incentive-compatible
differential service schemes. [17] uses both repeated game and mechanism design approaches to propose
cheat-proof and attack-resistant differential service schemes. Cooperative game theory has also been used
to investigate coalition formation among peers [18], [19].
In this paper, we investigate fundamental issues on incentives in content production and sharing over
P2P networks using game theory. Unlike existing game-theoretic works on P2P networks, which focus
on a particular game model to construct incentive schemes, we build a basic model and use it as a unified
framework based on which different incentive schemes are examined applying various game theoretic
models. Specifically, we analyze the basic model as a non-cooperative game and examine five incentive
schemes — cooperative, payment, repeated interaction, intervention, and enforced full sharing — using
different game formulations derived from the basic model, as summarized in Table I. Hence, instead of
arguing for a particular incentive scheme and a modeling approach, we show that alternative incentive
schemes can provide incentives for sharing in P2P networks from a neutral perspective. As can be seen
from Table I, different incentive schemes and the corresponding game models have different requirements
for implementation. Since the characteristics of P2P networks vary depending on their architecture, the
effectiveness of an incentive scheme will depend on the network environment. Thus, our analysis in this
paper can serve as a guideline for a protocol designer when modeling, comparing, and selecting incentive
schemes.
Another distinctive feature of our framework is that we allow peers to make production decisions
whereas most of existing works assume that peers are endowed with a certain amount of content (see, for
example, [11], [16]). When produced content and downloaded content are substitutable in consumption,
the amount of content a peer produces is affected by the amount of content available in a P2P network.
By endogenizing the amount of content that peers produce, we can capture the strategic link between
producing and downloading content. In addition, we consider scenarios where the sharing decisions of
peers can be enforced while production and download decisions are made in a non-cooperative manner.
These scenarios can be formulated as games with partial cooperation in which the strategies of players
can be enforced only in some stages. The concepts developed in the discussion of enforced sharing
decisions can be applied to other scenarios that can be modeled as multi-stage games.
4TABLE I: Comparisons of the approaches discussed in the paper. v , (v1, . . . , vN ) represents the utility
functions of peers. y∗ , (y∗1 , . . . , y∗N ) represents the Pareto efficient sharing levels of peers desired by
the protocol designer (PD). t∗ and q∗ represent optimal payment and intervention schemes, respectively,
that implements y∗. Rationality of peers are assumed throughout.
Section Approach Requirements (enforcement and information) Pareto efficiency Prop.
III Non-cooperative There are no requirements for the PD and peers. Inefficient 1
The PD knows v to compute y∗.
IV Cooperative The PD enforces y∗. Efficient 4
Peer i knows y∗.
The PD knows v to compute t∗.
V Payment The PD enforces t∗. Efficient 6
Peer i knows t∗.
Differential service The PD knows v to compute y∗.
VI.A based on Peer i knows y∗ and the punishment rule, Efficient 7
repeated interaction and maintains a history of past observations.
Differential service The PD knows v to compute q∗.
VI.B based on The PD enforces q∗. Efficient 8
intervention Peer i knows q∗.
Enforced The PD enforces full sharing (not sharing levels).
VII full sharing Peer i knows v for endogenous network formation. Inefficient 9, 11
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we formulate the basic model that describes
a scenario of content production and sharing. In Section III, we analyze the basic model as a non-
cooperative game and identify the free-rider problem. In Section IV, we investigate cooperative schemes
by deriving a coalitional game based on the basic model. In Section V, we augment the basic model
with a payment scheme to achieve cooperative outcomes among non-cooperative peers. In Section VI,
we study differential service schemes applying repeated game and intervention approaches to the basic
model. In Section VII, we analyze a partially cooperative scenario where full sharing is enforced. In
Section VIII, we provide numerical illustration. In Section IX, we conclude and discuss future directions.
Proofs of propositions are provided either following propositions or in Appendix B.
II. MODEL
We consider a completely connected P2P network of N peers as in [7], [11]. Peers produce content
(e.g., photos, videos, news, and customer reviews) and use the P2P network to distribute produced content.
Following [20], we model the content production and sharing scenario as a sequential game consisting
of three stages, which is called the content production and sharing (CPS) game.
5• Stage One (Production): Each peer determines its level of production.1 xi ∈ R+ represents the
amount of content produced by peer i and is known only to peer i.
• Stage Two (Sharing): Each peer specifies its level of sharing. yi ∈ [0, xi] represents the amount of
content that peer i makes available to other peers. (y1, . . . , yN ) is known to all peers at the end of
stage two.
• Stage Three (Transfer): Each peer determines the amounts of content that it downloads from other
peers. Peer i serves all the requests it receives from any other peer up to yi. zij ∈ [0, yj ] represents
the amount of content that peer i downloads from peer j 6= i, or equivalently peer j uploads to peer
i.
Let N , {1, . . . , N} be the set of peers in the P2P network. For notations, we define x , (x1, . . . , xN ),
y , (y1, . . . , yN ), and Z , [zij ]i,j∈N , an N -by-N matrix whose (i, j)-entry is given by zij , where we
set zii = 0 for all i ∈ N . The download profile of peer i is given by the ith row of Z, denoted by
zi , (zi1, . . . , ziN ). Similarly, the upload profile of peer i is given by the ith column of Z, denoted
by zi , (z1i, . . . , zNi). Given the elements of Z, we can compute the download volume of peer i by
di(zi) ,
∑N
j=1 zij and its upload volume by ui(zi) ,
∑N
j=1 zji. For notational convenience, we suppress
the dependence of di and ui on Z and write di and ui instead of di(zi) and ui(zi), respectively. Also, we
define w(Z) to be the total transfer volume of the P2P network given Z, i.e., w(Z) ,
∑N
i=1
∑N
j=1 zij =∑N
i=1 di =
∑N
i=1 ui, which can be considered as a measure of the utilization of the P2P network.
We assume that peers produce nonidentical content of homogeneous quality, which allows us to focus
on the quantity of content. The total amount of content that peer i has at the end of the CPS game, which
we call the consumption of peer i, is given by the sum of the amounts it produces and downloads, xi+di.
The utility of peer i is given by the benefit of consumption minus the costs of production, download,
and upload:
vi(x,y,Z) = f(xi + di)− κxi − δdi − σui.
We analyze the case of homogeneous peers in that f , κ, δ, and σ are the same for all peers.2 The benefit
of consumption is measured by a concave function f : R+ → R+ as in [21]. We assume that f is
twice continuously differentiable and satisfies f(0) = 0, f ′ > 0 and f ′′ < 0 on R++. We also assume
1We use the term production in a broad sense to mean any method of obtaining content other than download in the P2P
network.
2We consider homogeneous peers for analytic tractability. The concepts in this paper can be extended to the case with
heterogeneous peers in a straightforward manner.
6that f ′(0) is finite,3 f ′(0) > κ, and limx→∞ f ′(x) = 0 so that for every α ∈ (0, f ′(0)] there exists a
unique xˆα ≥ 0 that satisfies f ′(xˆα) = α. We use linear cost functions as widely adopted in the literature
(see, for example, [7], [22]).4 The cost of producing the amount of content xi is given by κxi, where
κ > 0 is the marginal cost of production. Download and upload create costs in terms of bandwidth
usage, and transferring the amount of content zij from peer i to peer j induces a cost of δzij to peer i
(the downloader) and σzij to peer j (the uploader), where δ > 0 and σ > 0 are the marginal costs of
download and upload, respectively. The P2P network has a positive social value only if obtaining a unit
of content through the P2P network costs less to peers than producing it privately. Hence, we assume
that κ > δ + σ to ensure that the P2P network is socially valuable.
We illustrate the considered scenario with an example of financial data. Suppose that peers need
financial data (e.g., earnings of companies, gross domestic products, and interest rates) in order to make
forecasts based on which they make investment decisions (e.g., trade stocks and bonds). To obtain financial
data, peers can either collect data by themselves or download data shared by other peers. A peer can
make a more informed decision with a larger amount of data. Hence, benefits that peers receive from data
can be represented by an increasing benefit function. The benefit function is concave when the marginal
returns of information are diminishing in the total amount. Alternatively, we can obtain a concave benefit
function by assuming that there is possible duplication in collected data, peers cannot identify the contents
of data before downloading them, and the benefit is proportional to the amount of distinct data. Appendix
A presents a formal proof of this statement.
III. NON-COOPERATIVE ANALYSIS
We first study the non-cooperative outcome of the CPS game, without any incentive or enforcement
device. Non-cooperative peers choose their strategies to maximize their own utilities given others’ strate-
gies. Thus, peers’ strategies should be self-enforcing at non-cooperative equilibrium in that no peer can
gain by choosing a different strategy unilaterally. A strategy for peer i in the CPS game is its complete
contingent plan over the three stages and is denoted by (xi, yi(xi), zi(xi,y)). A stage-one strategy for
peer i is represented by xi ∈ R+, a stage-two strategy by a function yi : R+ → R+ such that yi(xi) ≤ xi
for all xi ∈ R+, and a stage-three strategy by a function zi : I3 → RN+ such that zij(xi,y) ≤ yj for all
3We use f ′(0) to represent the right derivative of f at 0.
4The linearity of cost functions is assumed for analytic convenience as it allows us to obtain closed-form expressions for
production levels at various solution concepts. The results of this paper can be easily extended to the case of a general convex
cost function of production, as discussed in Sections III, IV, and V.
7j 6= i and zij(xi,y) = 0 for j = i, where I3 , {(xi,y)|xi ∈ R+, yi ∈ [0, xi], yj ∈ R+,∀j 6= i} is the
set of possible information sets at the beginning of stage three.
Nash equilibrium (NE) of the CPS game is defined as a strategy profile such that no peer can improve
its utility by a unilateral deviation. The play on the equilibrium path at an NE is called an NE outcome
of the CPS game. A refinement of NE for sequential games is subgame-perfect equilibrium (SPE),
which requires that players choose NE strategies in any subgame, thereby eliminating incredible threats.
Subgame perfection provides robustness in equilibrium strategies in that deviation is unprofitable not only
at the beginning of the game but also at any stage of the game. However, formally there is no subgame
of the CPS game starting from stage two or three because the stage-one choice of a peer is not revealed
to other peers. Hence, SPE fails to provide a refinement of NE in the CPS game.
In order to extend the spirit of subgame perfection to non-singleton information sets, we can use
sequential rationality, which postulates that players behave optimally in each information set for a
given belief system [10]. Sequential rationality is required by the solution concepts of perfect Bayesian
equilibrium (PBE) and sequential equilibrium (SE).5 The difference between these two solution concepts
disappears in the CPS game because the consistent belief of peer i on x−i , (x1, . . . , xi−1, xi+1, . . . , xN )
should be the correct x−i in both solution concepts. Hence, we use SE to refer to a solution concept
requiring sequential rationality and specify only the strategy profile to describe SE suppressing the belief
system with an implicit premise that peers hold correct beliefs.6 An SE strategy profile of the CPS game
can be found applying a backward induction argument, which is described in detail in [20]. As with NE,
the play on the equilibrium path at an SE is called an SE outcome of the CPS game.
Proposition 1. At the unique SE outcome of the CPS game, we have xi = xˆκ, yi = 0, zi = (0, . . . , 0)
for all i ∈ N . Thus, w(Z) = 0 at SE.
Proof: A formal proof can be found in [20, Prop. 1]. Since sharing can incur the cost of upload
while it gives no benefit to the sharing peer, it is never optimal for a peer to share a positive amount.
Expecting no sharing, each peer produces the autarkic optimal amount of content, xˆκ, which maximizes
5A strategy profile and a belief system constitute a PBE if the strategies are sequentially rational given the belief system and
the beliefs are updated using Bayes’ rule, whenever possible, given the strategy profile. SE is a refinement of PBE in that SE
perturbs the strategy profile to make Bayes’ rule applicable in every information set. See [10] for the formal definitions of PBE
and SE.
6This requirement can be relaxed using the notion of self-confirming equilibrium (SCE) [23], which requires only observational
consistency in beliefs.
8f(x)− κx.
Remark. Suppose that the cost of production is given by a general function c(xi) instead of κxi. There
is still no sharing at SE, but each peer produces an amount that maximizes f(x)− c(x), assuming that
a maximum exists.
Proposition 1 shows that when peers behave non-cooperatively, even a small cost of upload makes the
socially valuable P2P network never utilized because peers are not compensated for their upload. This
result explains the free-riding behavior of peers in file sharing P2P networks such as Napster and Gnutella,
as reported in [24], [25]. Using a similar argument as in the formal proof of Proposition 1, we can show
that the NE outcome of the CPS game is the same as the SE outcome. NE may prescribe suboptimal
strategies off the equilibrium path, but there cannot be a positive amount shared on the equilibrium
path.7 Individual utility and total utility at non-cooperative equilibrium are f∗(κ) and ΠNC = Nf∗(κ),
respectively, where we define f∗(α) = supx≥0{f(x)− αx} for α ∈ R as the conjugate of f [26].8
IV. COOPERATIVE SCHEMES
We consider cooperative schemes in the CPS game, which allow peers to form collaborative groups and
to maximize their joint welfare. In order to prevent peers from behaving non-cooperatively, cooperative
schemes need to enforce the actions of peers by a contract or a protocol. The protocol designer can
implement a cooperative scheme if he knows the utility functions of all peers in order to determine a
desired operating point and can enforce the operating point. An example of P2P networks to which a
cooperative scheme can be applied is a camera network, where cameras in different locations capture
the images of an object from various angles. A property that a desired operating point should possess is
Pareto efficiency (PE), which is satisfied when there is no other operating point that makes some peers
better off without making other peers worse off. We define social welfare by the sum of the utilities of
peers, i.e., Π(x,y,Z) ,
∑N
i=1 vi(x,y,Z). Then an allocation is Pareto efficient (PE) if it maximizes
social welfare among feasible allocations.9
Proposition 2. Let β , 1
N
κ + N−1
N
(δ + σ). At PE, we have
∑N
i=1 xi = xˆβ and xi = yi = zji for all
j 6= i, for all i ∈ N . Thus, w(Z) = (N − 1)xˆβ at PE.
7A similar remark holds for SCE. As soon as a peer shares its content, it learns that others request its content, and thus it
will choose not to share at all in order to avoid upload costs.
8Note that the definition of a conjugate is adjusted as f is a concave function.
9An allocation (x,y,Z) is feasible if xi ≥ 0, 0 ≤ yi ≤ xi, zii = 0, and 0 ≤ zij ≤ yj for all j 6= i, for all i ∈ N .
9Proof: A formal proof can be found in [20, Prop. 2]. PE can occur only when peers share all
produced content and download all shared content. Then the social welfare maximization problem can
be written as
max
x≥0
Nf
(
N∑
i=1
xi
)
− [κ+ (N − 1)(δ + σ)]
N∑
i=1
xi.
The first-order optimality condition for X ,
∑N
i=1 xi is f ′(X) = β. Note that β is the per capita marginal
cost of obtaining one unit of content when N peers share all produced content. Thus, at PE, the level of
total production is chosen to equate the marginal benefit and the marginal cost of supplying content to
every peer in the P2P network.
Remark. Proposition 2 determines production up to the aggregate level, leaving the individual levels
unspecified. This is a by-product of the linear cost function of production (i.e., constant returns to scale).
If we assume a strictly convex cost function (i.e., decreasing returns to scale), c(xi), instead of κxi, then
PE requires that every peer produce the same amount xo that maximizes f(Nx)−c(x)−(N−1)(δ+σ)x,
eliminating indeterminacy in the allocation of total production to peers.
At PE, peers jointly produce xˆβ and share all produced content so that each peer consumes the total
amount produced. The utility of peer i producing xoi at a PE allocation (xo,yo,Zo) is given by
vi(x
o,yo,Zo) = f(xˆβ)− δxˆβ − [κ+ (N − 1)σ − δ]x
o
i . (1)
Note that the utility of a peer is decreasing in its production level given that the total amount of production
is fixed and that all produced content is shared. Total utility at PE is given by ΠPE = Nf∗(β). Since
β < κ for N ≥ 2, the consumption of a peer and total utility are smaller at non-cooperative equilibrium
than at PE, i.e., xˆκ < xˆβ and ΠNC < ΠPE .
In order to derive a coalitional game [27] based on the CPS game, we need to compute the maximum
total utility that a subset of peers can achieve. Define β˜(n) by
β˜(n) =
1
n
κ+
n− 1
n
(δ + σ)
for n = 1, 2, . . .. Note that β˜(1) = κ, β˜(N) = β, and β˜(n) → δ+ σ as n→∞. β˜(n) can be interpreted
as the per capita marginal cost of obtaining one unit of content when n peers share all produced content.
The maximum total utility achievable with n peers is given by G(n) , nf∗(β˜(n)), and the maximum
average individual utility achievable with n peers by g(n) , G(n)/n = f∗(β˜(n)). Marginal product
(MP) measures an increment in the maximum total utility when the nth peer joins the P2P network, i.e.,
MP (1) , G(1) and MP (n) , G(n) −G(n − 1) = nf∗(β˜(n)) − (n− 1)f∗(β˜(n − 1)) for n ≥ 2. The
following proposition gives some properties of the functions g and MP .
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Proposition 3. (i) g(n) is increasing in n, and limn→∞ g(n) = f∗(δ + σ).
(ii) MP (n) is increasing in n, MP (n) > g(n) for all n ≥ 2, and limn→∞[MP (n)− g(n)] = 0.
Since g(n) is increasing in n, there are increasing returns to scale when inputs and outputs are taken to
be peers and total utility, respectively. As there are more peers in the P2P network, the cost of production
can be shared by more peers and the socially valuable P2P network can be utilized more extensively,
which results in an increase in the maximum average individual utility.10 Proposition 3(i) in addition
states that the maximum average individual utility is bounded above. Proposition 3(ii) shows that the
no-surplus condition in the sense of [29] is satisfied only in the limiting case with infinitely many peers.
This implies that the distribution of total utility to peers according to their MP, which is proposed by the
marginal productivity theory of distribution of neoclassical economics, is not feasible unless there are
infinitely many peers. Thus, we rely on cooperative game theory as an alternative theory of distribution.
Let S with S 6= ∅ and S ⊆ N be a coalition of peers. The characteristic function v, which assigns
each coalition the maximum total utility it can create, is given by
v(S) = |S|f∗(β˜(|S|)), (2)
where |S| denotes the number of peers in coalition S . We set v(∅) = 0. A coalitional game is described
by the characteristic function v, and we consider two solution concepts for coalitional games, the core
and the Shapley value. An allocation (x,y,Z) has the core property in the coalitional game v if
∑
i∈N
vi(x,y,Z) = v(N ) and
∑
i∈S
vi(x,y,Z) ≥ v(S), ∀ S ⊆ N .
The first condition states that the maximum total utility with the grand coalition N is distributed to
peers (i.e., a PE allocation is chosen) while the second condition states that no coalition can improve the
utilities of its members from the current allocation. Hence, the core describes the stable distributions of
total utility in that no coalition of peers can improve their utilities by separating from the grand coalition.
This implies that, when the protocol designer enforces an allocation with the core property, no coalition
of peers can object the allocation credibly by threatening to leave the P2P network. The Shapley value,
whose expression can be found in [27], is a distribution of total utility, v(N ), that satisfies a certain set
10In our model, there are no congestion effects in that the marginal costs of upload and download are independent of the
number of peers in the network. If we generalize our model so that the marginal costs of upload and download are increasing in
the number of peers, then additional peers will have not only positive externalities but also negative externalities on the existing
peers and there may exist an optimal network size that maximizes total utility as in [28].
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Fig. 1: Two-peer illustration of utility profiles achieved at non-cooperative and cooperative solution
concepts. Incentive schemes allow non-cooperative peers to achieve a cooperative outcome.
of axioms. The Shapley value can be considered as a fair distribution of utility as it takes into account
the MP of peers in all possible orders of arrival in the P2P network.
Proposition 4. (i) The core of the coalitional game v is a nonempty convex set whose vertices are given
by (MP (1),MP (2), . . . ,MP (N)) and all of its permutations. At the core, we have ∑Ni=1 xi = xˆβ ,
xi = yi = zji for all j 6= i, for all i ∈ N , and∑
i∈S
xi ≤ |S|
f(xˆβ)− δxˆβ − f
∗(β˜(|S|))
κ+ (N − 1)σ − δ
(3)
for all S ⊆ N .
(ii) The Shapley value of the coalitional game v is vi = f∗(β) for all i ∈ N , which is attained at the
symmetric PE allocation, xi = yi = zji = xˆβ/N for all j 6= i, for all i ∈ N .
Fig. 1 illustrates the results in Propositions 1, 2, and 4 with two peers. Since ΠNC < ΠPE , PE
allocations achieve a higher total utility than SE allocations. Also, since the core imposes additional
constraints on PE, the core is a subset of PE utility profiles. Proposition 3(ii) implies that the coalitional
game v is convex [30], and thus the results in Proposition 4 can be considered as the corollaries of
theorems in [30]. In particular, the core is nonempty and coincides with the unique stable set in the
sense of [31]. Also, the Shapley value is the center of gravity of the core, which is consistent with the
12
illustration in Fig. 1. Hence, by prescribing the allocation that yields the Shapley value, the protocol
designer can obtain the stability property of the core and the fairness property of the Shapley value at
the same time.
The maximum utility that a peer can obtain by itself is f∗(κ), which can be considered as a reservation
utility. An allocation (x,y,Z) satisfies the participation (or individual rationality) constraint for peer i
if vi(x,y,Z) ≥ f∗(κ). An allocation (x,y,Z) is participation-efficient if it is PE and satisfies the
participation constraint for every peer. Among PE allocations, condition (3) for a singleton coalition
S = {i}, which can be written as
xi ≤
f(xˆβ)− δxˆβ − f
∗(κ)
κ+ (N − 1)σ − δ
,
is required for the participation constraint for peer i. Since the utility of a peer decreases in its production
level among PE allocations as shown in (1), the participation constraint puts an upper bound on the
individual production level to prevent a peer from leaving the P2P network. The core is a stronger
concept than participation-efficiency in that the core prevents not only a single peer from leaving the P2P
network but also a subset of peers from forming their own P2P network.
Peers choose actions x, y, and Z over the three stages of the CPS game. Suppose that the protocol
designer can enforce the sharing levels of peers in stage two while he cannot enforce the choices in
stages one and three. Then the CPS game is reduced to the CPS game with enforced sharing levels ye,
where the stage-two choice of peers is fixed at some ye.
Proposition 5. Suppose that xˆκ ≤
∑N
i=1 y
e
i ≤ xˆδ. At the SE outcome of the CPS game with enforced
sharing levels ye, we have xi = yei = zji for all j 6= i, for all i ∈ N .
Proposition 5 shows that when peers are required to share ye that satisfies xˆκ ≤
∑N
i=1 y
e
i ≤ xˆδ, they
produce exactly the enforced sharing levels and download all shared content in their self-interest. Since
xˆκ ≤ xˆβ ≤ xˆδ, the protocol designer can implement a PE allocation by enforcing only the sharing levels
ye such that
∑N
i=1 y
e
i = xˆβ , leaving peers to choose the production and download levels on their own.
V. PAYMENT SCHEMES
Suppose that the protocol designer is unable to enforce the sharing levels of peers. The non-cooperative
analysis in Section III suggests that, in order to avoid the collapse of the P2P network, peers need to
be incentivized to share and upload their produced content. Pricing is an extensively studied form of
incentives to achieve an efficient use of network resources [32]. Pricing schemes have been used in
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P2P-based web services such as MojoNation in the forms of tokens and credits. We say that a pricing
scheme is optimal if it induces a PE non-cooperative equilibrium. In order to determine an optimal pricing
scheme, the protocol designer needs to know the utility functions of peers. An optimal pricing scheme
can be implemented when the protocol designer can enforce payments and each peer knows the pricing
rule applied to it.
In this section, we examine a class of pricing schemes under which the payment to a peer is increasing
in its upload volume and decreasing in its download volume at the same rate.11 We call such a pricing
scheme a linear pricing scheme, which can be expressed formally as
ti(Z) = p(ui − di)
for some price p > 0. Note that a linear pricing scheme with any price satisfies budget balance since it
simply transfers payments from downloaders to uploaders, i.e.,
∑N
i=1 ti(Z) = p(
∑N
i=1 ui−
∑N
i=1 di) = 0
for all Z and p. The payoff to peer i in the CPS game with the linear pricing scheme with price p is
given by
pii(x,y,Z) = vi(x,y,Z) + ti(Z) = f(xi + di)− κxi − (p+ δ)di + (p− σ)ui.
In effect, the linear pricing scheme with price p increases the cost of download from δ to p + δ and
decreases the cost of upload from σ to σ − p. If the reward for upload exceeds the cost of upload,
i.e., p > σ, then peers receive a net benefit from uploading, which provides them with an incentive for
sharing. The following proposition shows that there exists an optimal pricing scheme in the class of linear
pricing schemes. Moreover, the optimal linear pricing scheme transfers the utilities of peers so that the
equilibrium payoff profile coincides with the Shapley value for any PE allocation chosen by peers.
Proposition 6. Let p∗ = [κ + (N − 1)σ − δ]/N . At the SE outcome of the CPS game with the linear
pricing scheme with price p∗, we have
∑N
i=1 xi = xˆβ and xi = yi = zji for all j 6= i, for all i ∈ N . The
payoff of each peer at SE is given by f∗(β).
Proof: The result follows from Lemma 1 and Proposition 7 of [20].
Remark. As is the case with PE, indeterminacy in the allocation of total production to peers can be
eliminated by assuming a strictly convex cost function of production, c(xi). With a strictly convex cost
11Another class of pricing schemes, called MP pricing schemes, is proposed and analyzed in [20]. Under an MP pricing
scheme, payments are determined based on the sharing levels of peers.
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function of production, the optimal price p∗ can be found as in Proposition 6 replacing κ with c′(xo),
where xo is the individual production level at PE as discussed in the remark following Proposition 2.
A notable feature of the optimal price p∗ is that peers are indifferent between the two alternative
methods of obtaining data, production and download, when they face the optimal price. At PE without
pricing schemes, peers prefer download to production because the marginal cost of download, δ, is smaller
than that of production and upload, κ+(N − 1)σ (see the coefficient of the term xoi in (1)). The optimal
price is chosen such that it equates the effective marginal cost of download, p∗+δ, with that of production
and upload, κ− (N − 1)(p∗−σ). As a result, at SE with the optimal linear pricing scheme, peers obtain
the same payoff regardless of their production levels.
With linear cost functions and linear prices, this is a necessary property of any nondiscriminatory
pricing scheme that induces non-cooperative homogeneous peers to produce a positive bounded amount
of content in aggregate. If the payoff to a peer is increasing in its production level, then the peer would
be willing to produce and upload as much as it can (i.e., the peer is overcompensated for its production
and the supply of content is unbounded). On the other hand, if the payoff to a peer is decreasing in
its production level, then the peer would not produce at all (i.e., the peer is undercompensated for its
production and the supply of content is zero). The optimal price can be considered as an equilibrium
price of content in that the compensation is enough to provide incentives for production and upload but
prevents overproduction so that supply equals demand.
Imposing that yi = xi and ui = (N − 1)yi for all i ∈ N , the social welfare maximization problem
can be written as
max
x,d
N∑
i=1
{f(xi + di)− [κ+ (N − 1)σ]xi − δdi}
subject to xi ≥ 0, 0 ≤ di ≤
∑
j 6=i
xj , for all i = 1, . . . , N. (4)
Let pi ≥ 0 be a Lagrange multiplier on the constraint di ≤
∑
j 6=i xj for each i ∈ N , which can be
interpreted as the price that peer i pays for its download. Then the Lagrangian function can be written
as
L(x,d;p) =
N∑
i=1

f(xi + di)− [κ+ (N − 1)σ]xi − δdi + pi(
∑
j 6=i
xj − di)

 ,
and the first-order optimality conditions for xi and di are given by
f ′(xi + di)− κ− (N − 1)σ +
∑
j 6=i
pj ≤ 0 (with equality if xi > 0)
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and
f ′(xi + di)− δ − pi ≤ 0 (with equality if di > 0).
At PE, we have xi + di = xˆβ , which yields the Lagrange multiplier pi = p∗ for all i ∈ N . The dual
decomposition of (4) can be written as
max
xi,di≥0
f(xi + di)− [κ+ (N − 1)σ −
∑
j 6=i
pj ]xi − (pi + δ)di (5)
for each i. The solution to (5) is given by
xi = 0 and di = xˆ(pi+δ) if
N∑
j=1
pj < κ+ (N − 1)σ − δ,
xi + di = xˆ(pi+δ) = xˆ[κ+(N−1)σ−
∑
j 6=i
pj ] if
N∑
j=1
pj = κ+ (N − 1)σ − δ,
xi = xˆ[κ+(N−1)σ−
∑
j 6=i
pj ] and di = 0 if
N∑
j=1
pj > κ+ (N − 1)σ − δ.
12 (6)
Thus, the maximum value of (5) is given by hi(p) , f∗(min{pi + δ, κ + (N − 1)σ −
∑
j 6=i pj}), and
pi = p
∗ for all i is the solution of the dual problem, minp≥0
∑N
i=1 hi(p). Thus, a uniform linear pricing
scheme suffices to obtain PE allocations. The problem (4) is more general than the resource allocation
problem in [33] in the following aspect. In our problem, peers can choose to become either a seller or
a buyer (or both), and the amount of resources (i.e., content) supplied in the P2P network is chosen by
peers. On the contrary, in [33], buyers and sellers are predetermined, and sellers hold a fixed supply of
resources.
If the protocol designer knows the utility functions of peers, he can compute the optimal price p∗
using the expression in Proposition 6. At the optimal price, equilibrium requires that peers produce xˆβ in
aggregate. Peers can coordinate to achieve total production xˆβ using the following quantity adjustment
process. Initially, each peer i chooses arbitrary optimal production and download levels (xi, di), which
satisfy xi+di = xˆβ . Peers share their production fully throughout the process, and thus they can observe
the production levels of other peers indirectly. If
∑N
i=1 xi > xˆβ (respectively,
∑N
i=1 xi < xˆβ), then
di <
∑
j 6=i xj (respectively, di >
∑
j 6=i xj) for all i. Hence, if each peer i adjusts its production and
download levels by
dxi
dt
= −
ddi
dt
= ηi

di −∑
j 6=i
xj

 (7)
12We set xˆα = +∞ when α ≤ 0.
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for some constant ηi > 0,13 then the allocation will converge to an equilibrium allocation, which satisfies∑N
i=1 xi = xˆβ .
Suppose instead that the protocol designer does not know the utility functions of peers. In this case,
the protocol designer can still find the optimal price by using a price adjustment process similar to that
in [34]. In other words, a price adjustment process can substitute knowledge about the utility functions
of peers. In the proposed price adjustment process, the protocol designer announces a price p, which
applies to every peer. Given the price, each peer i chooses (xi, di) by solving (5) and reports its choice to
the protocol designer. We assume that peers can coordinate their choices to satisfy di =
∑
j 6=i xj for all
i ∈ N whenever possible, for example, by using the quantity adjustment process (7). The total demand
for content at price p is denoted by D(p) and can be computed as
∑N
i=1 di. Similarly, the total supply
of content at price p is denoted by S(p) and can be computed as
∑N
i=1 ui = (N − 1)
∑N
i=1 xi, as a peer
can upload its production up to (N − 1) times. Using (6), we obtain
D(p) =


Nxˆ(p+δ) if p < p∗
(N − 1)xˆβ if p = p∗
0 if p > p∗
and S(p) =


0 if p < p∗
(N − 1)xˆβ if p = p∗
N(N − 1)xˆ[κ−(N−1)(p−σ)] if p > p∗
,
as depicted in Fig. 2. We define the excess demand at price p by ED(p) , D(p)− S(p). The protocol
designer adjusts the price following the process
dp
dt
= ηED(p)
for some constant η > 0. Since ED(p) > 0 for p < p∗ and ED(p) < 0 for p > p∗, the price will
converge to the optimal price p∗ starting from any initial price. We compare the above price adjustment
process with that in [34]. In [34], there are multiple resources with fixed supply, and each resource
manager adjusts the price of his resource so that aggregate demand for the resource equals the supply
of the resource. In our formulation, by focusing on a uniform linear pricing scheme, we treat resources
provided by different peers as a single resource. Hence, the protocol designer needs to aggregate demand
and supply by all peers and adjust the price of content to eliminate excess demand or supply.
We have assumed that peers report their demand and supply truthfully in the price adjustment process.
Suppose instead that peers know the price adjustment process used by the protocol designer and can
engage in strategic misrepresentation as in [35]. We find that, unlike in [35], no peer can gain from
influencing the equilibrium price by misreporting its demand or supply provided that other peers report
13Since xi cannot be negative, we assume that peer i stops adjusting its quantity when xi = 0 and di < ∑j 6=i xj .
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Fig. 2: Equilibrium interpretation of the optimal price p∗. D(p) represents the total demand for download
and S(p) the total supply of upload at price p. The equilibrium price equates demand and supply, i.e.,
D(p∗) = S(p∗). The protocol designer can reach the equilibrium price by adjusting the price depending
on the excess demand, ED.
truthfully. In [35], a user, acting as a buyer, can benefit from a lower price of a resource by underreporting
its demand. On the contrary, in our model, a peer is both a buyer and a seller, and thus it can lower
the price only by increasing its supply, which hurts it as a seller. Peer i can make the price adjustment
process stop at p′ < p∗ by reporting xi = xˆ(p′+δ) and di = 0. Since p′ + δ < β < κ− (N − 1)(p′ − σ),
the payoff of peer i is
pii = f(xˆ(p′+δ))− [κ− (N − 1)(p
′ − σ)]xˆ(p′+δ) < f(xˆ(p′+δ))− βxˆ(p′+δ) < f
∗(β),
and thus it obtains a lower payoff by manipulating the equilibrium price at p′. For p > p∗, the optimal
production and download levels for peer j are xj = xˆ[κ−(N−1)(p−σ)] and dj = 0. Since di ≤
∑
j 6=i xj ,
peer i alone cannot induce ED(p) = 0, or
∑N
i=1 di = (N − 1)
∑N
i=1 xi, for some p > p∗, if N > 2.
When N = 2, peer i can make the price adjustment process stop at p′′ > p∗ by reporting xi = 0 and
di = xˆ[κ−(N−1)(p′′−σ)]. Since κ− (N − 1)(p′′ − σ) < β < p′′ + δ, the payoff of peer i is
pii = f
(
xˆ[κ−(N−1)(p′′−σ)]
)
− (p′′ + δ)xˆ[κ−(N−1)(p′′−σ)]
< f
(
xˆ[κ−(N−1)(p′′−σ)]
)
− βxˆ[κ−(N−1)(p′′−σ)] < f
∗(β).
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Again, peer i cannot gain from misreporting.
VI. DIFFERENTIAL SERVICE SCHEMES
Another form of incentives that encourage sharing by non-cooperative peers is differential service,
in which peers obtain different qualities of service depending on their contribution levels. Differential
service schemes are widely adopted in file sharing P2P networks such as BitTorrent [36] and KaZaA, in
the forms of tit-for-tat and reputation. In this section, we capture the differential service in the CPS game
using two modeling approaches based on repeated games and intervention. In a repeated game model,
peers can reciprocate service to each other based on private or public history. In an intervention model,
the system treats peers differentially based on their contribution to the system.
A. Repeated Game Model
Suppose that peers interact repeatedly over time in the P2P network. The repeated game model can
support a cooperative outcome among non-cooperative peers by providing rewards and punishments
depending on the past behavior of peers. The repeated CPS game is a supergame in which the CPS game
is played repeatedly. We use the limit of means criterion [37] to evaluate the utility of a peer in the
repeated CPS game to obtain the following result.14
Proposition 7. Any participation-efficient allocation can be supported as a non-cooperative equilibrium
of the repeated CPS game.
By Proposition 5, any deviation that is profitable in the current CPS game involves a deviation in
sharing levels, which can be publicly observed by peers. Hence, the protocol designer can deter peers
from free-riding in the P2P network by making peers play the SE of the one-shot CPS game in all
subsequent CPS games whenever a peer does not share its required amount of content. We have assumed
that peers serve all the download requests they receive in stage three. Suppose instead that a peer can
choose whether to upload or not to another peer that requests its content. Then the punishment following
a deviation in sharing levels can be asymmetric by prescribing peers not to upload to a peer that has
ever deviated, which effectively excludes the deviating peer from the P2P network. Similarly, refusing
a download request from a peer that has not deviated can also be deterred by using private retaliation
14A similar result can be obtained with the discounting criterion, in which case Proposition 7 is restated as “Any strictly
participation-efficient allocation can be supported as a non-cooperative equilibrium of the repeated CPS game when peers are
sufficiently patient.”
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(i.e., a non-deviating peer whose request was refused does the same thing in return to the peer that has
refused its request) in all subsequent CPS games.
B. Intervention Model
Intervention [38] refers to the system directly influencing the usage of users depending on their behavior.
We consider a particular form of intervention applicable to P2P networks. Suppose that the P2P network
can reduce the download rate of a peer depending on its rating, where the rating of peer i is defined by
its upload to download ratio, i.e., ri = ui/di. Then a differential service scheme based on intervention
can be described by an intervention function q : R+ → R+, which represents an increase in the marginal
cost of download. That is, when peer i has rating ri, its marginal cost of download after intervention is
given by δ + q(ri). Note that the range of q is constrained to be nonnegative since we assume that the
system can only decrease the download rates. This imposes a restriction in incentive design compared to
a payment scheme, where it is usually assumed that a payment function can take any positive or negative
real number. However, incentive schemes based on intervention have advantages in implementation over
those based on payment and repeated games. Unlike a payment scheme, there is no need for transactions
in an intervention scheme since intervention affects peers directly through the system. Also, intervention
can be considered as a substitute of the punishment strategy in repeated games, but it requires neither
repeated interaction among peers nor the maintenance of history since punishment is executed by the
system architecture rather than by peers.15 We say that an intervention scheme is optimal if it achieves
a PE allocation with zero intervention level at non-cooperative equilibrium. Since any positive level of
intervention results in performance degradation, it is desirable to have intervention only as a threat, which
is called for when misbehavior occurs.
Proposition 8. Define an intervention function q∗ by q∗(ri) = p∗[1−ri]+, where p∗ = [κ+(N−1)σ−δ]/N
and [r]+ = max{r, 0}. At the SE outcome of the CPS game with the intervention scheme q∗, we have
xi = yi = zji = xˆβ/N for all j 6= i, for all i ∈ N . Moreover, q∗(ri) = 0 at SE.
Proof: As long as ri ≤ 1, or ui ≤ di, for all i, the intervention scheme q∗ is equivalent to the
optimal linear pricing scheme p∗. Since increasing ui beyond di can only increase the cost of upload
without affecting the level of intervention, we must have ui ≤ di for all i at SE. Among SE with the
15For example, the considered type of intervention can be implemented in a distributed way by requiring peers to use a certain
program to download and upload files, which can adjust the download rate of a peer automatically based on its past usage.
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optimal pricing scheme p∗ given in Proposition 6, ui ≤ di is satisfied for all i only when the amount of
total production xˆβ is split equally to all peers. At this allocation, ui = di = (N − 1)xˆβ/N , and thus
ri = 1 and q∗(ri) = 0 at SE.
Proposition 8 shows that an optimal intervention scheme can be constructed to achieve the symmetric
PE allocation without intervening at equilibrium. Under the optimal intervention scheme q∗, a peer
experiences a reduced download rate whenever it downloads more than it uploads. Since every peer
downloads and uploads the same amount at the symmetric PE allocation, reduced download rates act
only as a threat at equilibrium, deterring peers from deviation. The model of [7] can be considered as
using another form of intervention, where the system determines the proportion of shared content that
a peer is allowed to download as a function of the contribution of the peer. The model of [22] can
also be interpreted as using an intervention scheme, where the system no longer serves a peer when
its cumulative average rating falls below a threshold level. [38] applies an intervention scheme to a
multi-user access network, where the system can jam packets randomly with a probability that depends
on the transmission probabilities of users. In [38], intervention affects all users in the system to the
same degree, thus represented by a function that depends on the actions of all users. On the contrary,
intervention considered in the CPS game, [7], and [22] influences a peer depending only on its own
action, thus allowing the differential service to peers.
VII. ENFORCED FULL SHARING
We have seen from Proposition 5 that the protocol designer can achieve a PE allocation by enforcing
the sharing levels of peers. As an alternative scenario, suppose that the protocol designer can enforce
full sharing among peers, but not sharing levels.16 The resulting CPS game is called the CPS game with
enforced full sharing. Formally, the CPS game with enforced full sharing is a restricted version of the
CPS game where the stage-two choice of each peer i is fixed as yi = xi. Note that enforced sharing levels
constrain the production decisions of peers in that peers need to produce at least the required sharing
levels. On the contrary, under enforced full sharing, peers can choose any levels of production in stage
one. The following proposition characterizes allocations at the SE of the CPS game with enforced full
sharing.
Proposition 9. Let γ , κ + (N − 1)σ. Define x˜γ by x˜γ = xˆγ if γ ≤ f ′(0) and x˜γ = 0 otherwise (i.e.,
16For example, full sharing can be enforced when there exists an indispensable technology for production and peers have
access to it under the condition of sharing the produced content.
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x˜γ = argmaxx≥0{f(x)− γx}). At the SE outcome of the CPS game with enforced full sharing, we have∑N
i=1 xi = x˜γ and xi = yi = zji for all j 6= i, for all i ∈ N . Thus, w(Z) = (N − 1)x˜γ at SE with
enforced full sharing.
Proof: A formal proof can be found in [20, Prop. 3]. Since peers download all shared content at
SE, enforced full sharing increases the effective marginal cost of production from κ to κ + (N − 1)σ,
which includes the marginal cost of upload to (N − 1) peers. The stage-one problem for peer i can be
written as
max
xi≥0
f
(
N∑
i=1
xi
)
− [κ+ (N − 1)σ]xi − δ
∑
j 6=i
xj
given x−i, and the result follows.
As peers face effectively a higher cost of production with enforced full sharing, non-cooperative peers
reduce their production when full sharing is enforced, i.e., x˜γ < Nxˆκ. Total utility at SE with enforced
full sharing is given by ΠFS = N [f(x˜γ)− βx˜γ ].
To make welfare comparisons, we first consider a scenario in which the number of peers in the P2P
network is fixed as N . The price of anarchy (PoA)17 is defined to be the ratio of social welfare at the
worst non-cooperative equilibrium to that at PE, i.e.,
PoA ,
ΠNC
ΠPE
=
f∗(κ)
f∗(β)
. (8)
The price of no sharing (PoNS) compares social welfare at SE with and without enforced full sharing,
i.e.,
PoNS ,
ΠNC
ΠFS
=
f∗(κ)
f(x˜γ)− βx˜γ
(= +∞ if x˜γ = 0).
Finally, the price of underproduction (PoU) compares social welfare at SE with enforced full sharing and
at PE, i.e.,
PoU ,
ΠFS
ΠPE
=
f(x˜γ)− βx˜γ
f∗(β)
. (9)
When x˜γ > 0, the PoA can be decomposed as the product of the PoNS and the PoU, i.e., PoA =
PoNS×PoU . The PoA is a widely used measure of the inefficiency of non-cooperative equilibria. The
PoNS measures the welfare implication of enforced full sharing on selfish peers, and thus it can be used
to analyze the value of a technology that enables enforced full sharing. The PoU measures inefficiency
17Since the non-cooperative outcome of the CPS game is unique, the price of anarchy and the price of stability coincide for
the CPS game.
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due to underproduction caused by the selfish behavior of peers assuming that full sharing is enforced.
The following proposition examines the range of values that each measure of inefficiency can take when
we vary the utility specification of the model, f , κ, δ, and σ.
Proposition 10. For a fixed size N ≥ 2 of the P2P network, PoA ∈ (0, 1), PoNS ∈ (0,∞], and
PoU ∈ [0, 1). These bounds are tight.
Proof: A formal proof can be found in [20, Prop. 4].
Since β < κ < γ for N ≥ 2, it follows immediately from (8) and (9) that PoA,PoU < 1, which
shows that selfish behavior results in efficiency losses regardless of whether full sharing is enforced or
not. The relative size of ΠNC and ΠFS is ambiguous, which implies that the enforcement of full sharing
may make peers worse off. This is because enforced full sharing has two offsetting effects on social
welfare. On one hand, full sharing has a positive effect on welfare by reducing the cost of obtaining
one unit of content to β, compared to κ in the case of no sharing. On the other hand, full sharing has a
negative effect by increasing the effective cost of producing one unit of content from κ to γ. Therefore,
the overall welfare implication of enforced full sharing is determined by the stronger of the two effects.
Next we consider a scenario in which the number of peers in a P2P network is endogenously determined
by peers. There are total N peers that are connected to each other, and they can form groups to share
their content within a group. The maximum average individual utility increases with the number of peers
in a group as shown in Proposition 3(i). Thus, in a cooperative scenario, peers will form a P2P network
with all the N peers if they accept a new peer as long as the inclusion of an additional peer benefits
existing peers assuming that peers split total utility equally. In a non-cooperative scenario, peers do not
share content at all, and thus their utilities do not depend on the number of peers. Hence, the previous
results that ΠPE = Nf∗(β) and ΠNC = Nf∗(κ) are still valid with endogenous network formation. To
analyze a scenario with enforced full sharing, define γ˜(n) by γ˜(n) = κ + (n − 1)σ for n = 1, 2, . . ..
Then the average individual utility of a peer in a P2P network of size n is given by
gFS(n) = f(x˜γ˜(n))− β˜(n)x˜γ˜(n).
Increasing the size of a P2P network has two opposing effects on average individual utility. On one hand,
increasing the number of peers benefits peers by reducing the effective marginal cost of obtaining content
as represented by β˜, which decreases with n. On the other hand, increasing the number of peers does
harm to peers by increasing the effective marginal cost of producing content as represented by γ˜, which
increases with n. Hence, we can expect that there exists an optimal size of a P2P network that balances
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these positive and negative effects.
Since gFS(1) = f∗(κ) > 0 and gFS(n) = 0 for all n ≥ (f ′(0)−κ)/σ+1, there must exist a maximizer
of gFS(n) among n = 1, . . . , ⌊(f ′(0)−κ)/σ+1⌋, denoted by N∗, where ⌊α⌋ is the largest integer smaller
than or equal to α. We assume that N∗ is unique, which will hold for a generic specification of the utility
function. When N peers form P2P networks endogenously to maximize their individual utilities, they
will form ⌊N/N∗⌋ networks of size N∗ and one network of residual peers. Hence, total utility that a
coalition S can create is given by
vFS(S) =
⌊
|S|
N∗
⌋
N∗gFS(N∗) +
(
|S| −
⌊
|S|
N∗
⌋)
gFS
(
|S| −
⌊
|S|
N∗
⌋)
.
In order to examine the stability property of endogenous network formation, we characterize the core of
the coalitional game vFS .
Proposition 11. Suppose that N∗ < N . If N is a multiple of N∗, then the core of the coalitional game
vFS consists of a unique element vi = gFS(N∗) for all i ∈ N . Otherwise, the core is empty.
Note that we necessarily have N∗ < N when N ≥ (f ′(0) − κ)/σ + 1. When N is not a multiple
of N∗, there is a residual network, whose size is smaller than N∗. A peer in the residual network can
bid a utility smaller than gFS(N∗) to form a network of size N∗ including itself, yielding instability for
the networks of size N∗. Suppose that N is a multiple of N∗ so that the core is nonempty. The utility
profile in the core is achieved by peers forming N/N∗ networks, producing xi = xˆγ˜(N∗)/N∗ for all i,
and sharing all produced content within a network. Social welfare at the allocation with the core property
is ΠFS = NgFS(N∗). Since gFS(N∗) ≥ gFS(1) = f∗(κ), we have PoNS ≤ 1 when peers can form
P2P networks of the optimal size. That is, with endogenous network formation, enforced full sharing can
only improve the welfare of peers because peers are given the option of operating in an autarkic manner.
VIII. NUMERICAL ILLUSTRATION
In this section, we provide illustrative results using a particular utility specification and varying the
number of peers. For the utility function of peers, we use f(x) = log(1 + x), κ = 0.3, δ = 0.0025,
and σ = 0.01.18 We consider the (exogenous) number of peers in the P2P network, N , from 1 to 100.
Fig. 3(a) shows average individual utility in the three scenarios: f∗(β) in the cooperative case, f∗(κ) in
the non-cooperative case, and f(x˜γ)− βx˜γ in the partially cooperative case (i.e., enforced full sharing).
18The authors of [21] use the same benefit function for their illustrative examples.
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It can be seen that f∗(β) is increasing in N , verifying Proposition 3(i), that f∗(κ) is independent of N ,
and that f(x˜γ) − βx˜γ reaches a peak at N = 5 and is zero for all N ≥ 71. Fig. 3(b) plots total utility
in the three scenarios: ΠPE in the cooperative case, ΠNC in the non-cooperative case, and ΠFS in the
partially cooperative case.
Fig. 3(c) compares the MP of the nth peer, MP (n), with the maximum average individual utility that
n peers can achieve, g(n), verifying Proposition 3(ii). Fig. 3(d) plots the three inefficiency measures
defined in Section VII. Since f∗(κ) is independent of N , we can see that the PoA and the PoNS change
with N in the opposite way that f∗(β) and f(x˜γ)− βx˜γ change, respectively. Since f∗(β) converges to
f∗(δ + σ) = 3.3945, the PoA converges to f∗(κ)/f∗(δ + σ) = 0.1485 as N goes to infinity. Fig. 3(e)
shows the utilization of the P2P network in the three scenarios: (N − 1)xˆβ in the cooperative case, 0 in
the non-cooperative case, and (N − 1)xˆγ in the partially cooperative case. We can see no utilization in
the non-cooperative case and underutilization (and no utilization for N ≥ 71) in the partially cooperative
case compared to the cooperative case, which exhibits a high utilization of the P2P network. Finally,
Fig. 3(f) plots the optimal linear price p∗ as a function of N . As can be seen its expression in Proposition
6, p∗ decreases with N and converges to σ = 0.01 as N goes to infinity.
IX. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this paper, we have provided a unified framework to investigate incentive issues in content produc-
tion and sharing using various game theoretic approaches. We have characterized the non-cooperative
and cooperative outcomes of the CPS game and have shown that incentive schemes such as payment
schemes and differential service schemes can yield a cooperative outcome among non-cooperative peers.
Throughout the paper, we have discussed enforcement and information requirements to implement the
solutions of different approaches with a protocol. Our analysis allows protocol designers to compare
the performance and the overheads19 of different approaches and eventually helps them select the best
approach given a network environment they face.
We have maintained the homogeneity assumption in order to keep our model tractable so that we can
better illustrate different approaches by providing analytic results. However, all the concepts in this paper
can be straightforwardly applied to the case of peers with heterogeneous utility functions. The convexity of
the coalitional game in the cooperative approach will still hold, but computing cooperative solutions will
19In this paper, we have mainly focused on communication and informational overheads, and have not addressed the issues
of the complexity of computing different game theoretic solutions. Some complexity issues can be found in [39].
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Fig. 3: Numerical results with f(x) = log(1 + x), κ = 0.3, δ = 0.0025, σ = 0.01, and varying N from
1 to 100: (a) average individual utility, (b) total utility, (c) marginal product and the maximum average
individual utility, (d) inefficiency measures, (e) utilization of the P2P network, and (f) optimal linear
prices.
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become more complicated with heterogeneous peers. Non-cooperative solutions will remain the same with
a minor change that individually optimal production levels will differ across peers. Also, heterogeneous
peers in a distributed system offer a natural scenario to which a mechanism design approach can be
applied. Lastly, the protocol designer may need to discriminate heterogeneous peers in order to achieve
a cooperative outcome using a linear pricing scheme. Investigating how the results in this paper extend
to and change in P2P networks with heterogeneous peers will provide interesting and challenging future
research directions.
APPENDIX A
BENEFIT FUNCTION PROPORTIONAL TO THE AMOUNT OF DISTINCT FILES
For simplicity, suppose that peers choose the number of files from the set of nonnegative integers.
There are total M files that can be potentially produced by a peer, where M is a large positive integer.
When peer i produces xi files, it draws xi files with replacement from the M files. (Now κ can be
considered as a constant cost of a draw.) Each file is drawn with equal probability of 1/M . Let ci be the
number of files that peer i consumes, i.e., ci = xi + di. Since peers cannot identify the content of files
produced by others before download, ci files that peer i consumes can be considered as ci independent
draws from the M files. The probability that a given file is not one of the ci files is
(
1− 1
M
)ci
. Hence,
the expected number of distinct files in the ci files is
M
[
1−
(
1−
1
M
)ci]
.
Since
(
1− 1
M
)ci ≥ 1− ci
M
, we have
M
[
1−
(
1−
1
M
)ci]
≤ ci,
and ci −M
[
1−
(
1− 1
M
)ci] is the expected number of redundant files in the ci files. If the benefit of
consumption is proportional to the number of distinct files, the expected benefit function is given by
f(ci) = aM
[
1−
(
1−
1
M
)ci]
for some constant a > 0. Note that f satisfies all the assumptions for a benefit function given in Section
II when a > κ if we take ci as a nonnegative real number rather than a nonnegative integer. In particular,
f(0) = 0 and f is concave.
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APPENDIX B
PROOFS OF PROPOSITIONS
Proof of Proposition 3. (i) Note that g(n) = f∗(β˜(n)) = f∗ ◦ β˜(n). Also, f∗(α) = f(xˆα) − αxˆα,
where f ′(xˆα) = α, for α ∈ (0, f ′(0)]. That is, xˆα is the unique maximizer of f(x) − αx on R+.
Choose α1, α2 ∈ (0, f ′(0)] such that α1 < α2. Then f∗(α2) = f(xˆα2) − α2xˆα2 < f(xˆα2) − α1xˆα2 <
f(xˆα1)− α1xˆα1 = f
∗(α1). Hence, f∗ is decreasing on (0, f ′(0)]. Since
β˜(n) =
1
n
(κ− δ − σ) + δ + σ,
β˜ is decreasing in n and its range lies in (δ + σ, κ] ⊂ (0, f ′(0)]. Since g is a composite function of two
decreasing functions, it is increasing.
Since f is closed and strictly concave on R+, f∗ is differentiable on R++ [26]. Then f∗ is continuous
on R++, and thus limn→∞ g(n) = limn→∞ f∗(β˜(n)) = f∗(limn→∞ β˜(n)) = f∗(δ + σ).
(ii) To prove that MP is increasing in n, it suffices to show the strict convexity of G, taking the domain
of β˜ and G as R++ instead of {1, 2, . . .}. Since G(n) = nf∗(β˜(n)) and f∗ and β˜ are differentiable on
R++, by the chain rule G is differentiable and
G′(n) = f∗(β˜(n)) + n(f∗)′(β˜(n))β˜′(n).
Note that (f∗)′ = −(f ′)−1 on (0, f ′(0)), f ′ is continuously differentiable on R++, and f ′′(x) 6= 0 for
all x ∈ R++. By the inverse function theorem, f∗ is twice continuously differentiable on (0, f ′(0)), and
we have
G′′(n) = (f∗)′(β˜(n))[2β˜′(n) + nβ˜′′(n)] + n(f∗)′′(β˜(n))(β˜′(n))2.
Since 2β˜′(n)+nβ˜′′(n) = 0 and f∗ is strictly convex on (0, f ′(0)), we have G′′(n) = n(f∗)′′(β˜(n))(β˜′(n))2 >
0 for all n ∈ R++. Thus, MP (n) is increasing in n.
Note that MP (n) − g(n) = (n − 1)[g(n) − g(n − 1)] for n ≥ 2. Since g is increasing, we have
MP (n)− g(n) > 0 for all n ≥ 2.
Since f∗ is convex and differentiable, we have
f∗(β˜(n))− f∗(β˜(n− 1)) ≤ −(f∗)′(β˜(n))[β˜(n− 1)− β˜(n)]
= xˆ
β˜(n)[β˜(n− 1)− β˜(n)]
< xˆ(δ+σ)[β˜(n− 1)− β˜(n)].
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Note that
(n− 1)[β˜(n− 1)− β˜(n)] =
1
n
(κ− δ − σ).
Hence,
0 < (n− 1)[g(n) − g(n− 1)] < xˆ(δ+σ)
1
n
(κ− δ − σ),
and taking limits as n→∞ yields the desired result. 
Proof of Proposition 4. (i) Proposition 3(ii) implies that the coalitional game v is convex. Hence,
the first sentence follows from theorems 3 and 4 of [30]. The first condition for the core property,∑
i∈N vi(x,y,Z) = v(N ), is equivalent to PE, which requires
∑N
i=1 xi = xˆβ , xi = yi = zji for all
j 6= i, for all i ∈ N as shown in Proposition 2. Choose an arbitrary coalition S . For a PE allocation
(x,y,Z), we have
∑
i∈S
vi(x,y,Z) = f(xˆβ)− δxˆβ − [κ+ (N − 1)σ − δ]
∑
i∈S
xi.
Hence, using (2), we can show that (3) is equivalent to the second condition for the core property,∑
i∈S vi(x,y,Z) ≥ v(S).
(ii) Let (v1, . . . , vN ) be the Shapley value of the coalitional game v. By the efficiency property of
the Shapley value, we have
∑N
i=1 vi = v(N ). Also, by the symmetry axiom, we have vi = vj for all
i, j ∈ N . Combining these two yields vi = v(N )/N = f∗(β) for all i ∈ N . Using (1), we can see that
xi = xˆβ/N is necessary to obtain the Shapley value. 
Proof of Proposition 5. Suppose that di <
∑
j 6=i y
e
j for some i ∈ N at SE. Then it must be the case that
xi+
∑
j 6=i y
e
j > xˆδ. Since
∑
j 6=i y
e
j ≤ xˆδ, we have xi > 0. Then we obtain a contradiction to SE because
peer i can improve its utility by reducing xi and increasing di by the same amount. Thus, zij = yej for
all j 6= i, for all i ∈ N .
The requirement for peer i that yi = yei in stage two restricts its stage-one choice with xi ≥ yei . Suppose
that xi > yei for some i ∈ N at SE. Since di =
∑
j 6=i y
e
j at SE, the first-order effect of increasing xi
on vi is given by ∂vi/∂xi = f ′(xi +
∑
j 6=i y
e
j )− κ. Since xi > yei implies xi +
∑
j 6=i y
e
j > xˆκ, we have
∂vi/∂xi < 0 for xi > yei , and thus peer i becomes worse off by choosing xi > yei , contradicting SE. 
Proof of Proposition 7. Let (xo,yo,Zo) be a participation-efficient allocation. Consider the following
repeated game strategy for peer i: start with a cooperative strategy in the CPS game xi = xoi , yi(xi) = xi,
and zi(xi,y) = z∗i (xi,y), where z∗i (xi,y) is the optimal download profile of peer i given (xi,y), play
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the cooperative strategy if y = yo in all the previous CPS games, and play the SE strategy of the one-
shot CPS game, i.e., xi = xˆκ, yi(xi) = 0, and zi(xi,y) = z∗i (xi,y), if y 6= yo in at least one of the
previous CPS games. Proposition 5 implies that peer i cannot gain in the current CPS game by deviating
to xi > xoi or zij < y
o
j for some j 6= i. Hence, a profitable deviation involves either xi < xoi in stage
one or yi < y
o
i in stage two (or both). Either case results in a reduction in the sharing level from yoi .
Since sharing levels are publicly observed, any profitable deviation is detectable and punishment will be
triggered. Since the gain from deviation in the current CPS game is bounded above, it will be erased
by the punishment in the long run. In other words, peer i receives voi = vi(xo,yo,Zo) on average if it
follows the described repeated game strategy and f∗(κ) if it deviates in a way that the deviation increases
the current utility. Since (xo,yo,Zo) is participation-efficient, we have voi ≥ f∗(κ) for all i ∈ N . Hence,
the described repeated game strategy, which realizes the allocation (xo,yo,Zo) in every CPS game, is a
non-cooperative equilibrium of the repeated CPS game. 
Proof of Proposition 11. Assume that the core is nonempty and choose a utility profile v = (v1, . . . , vN )
in the core. Suppose that there exists a peer i with vi < gFS(N∗). Consider a coalition S of size N∗
that do not include peer i, which must exist since N > N∗. Then
∑
j∈S vj = N
∗gFS(N∗), and thus∑
j∈S\{k} vj ≤ (N
∗ − 1)gFS(N∗), where peer k is the one that receives the highest utility among peers
in S . Then
∑
j∈({i}
⋃
S\{k}) vj < N
∗gFS(N∗), and thus peer i and peers in S \ {k} can block the utility
profile v. Hence, we need to have vi ≥ gFS(N∗) for all i ∈ N . This is possible, with equality, only if
N is a multiple of N∗. We can confirm that the core is nonempty since the utility profile vi = gFS(N∗)
for all i ∈ N satisfies the definition of the core. 
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